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Supplement to “Epidemics and control strategies for diseases of farmed 
salmonids: A parameter study,” by Jonkers, Sharkey, Thrush, Turnbull, and 
Morgan 
 
 
Outbreak Simulations 
From November 2009 to January 2010 over three hundred thousand simulation jobs 
were executed on the University of Liverpool’s Condor pool of circa 600 nodes, 
taking about 196,566 cpu hours to complete. The Condor project is a workload 
management system for compute-intensive jobs developed at the university of 
Wisconsin (http://www.cs.wisc.edu/condor/). Its main strength is its support of High 
Throughput Computing (HTC) on large collections of distributively-owned 
computing resources. Because epidemiological simulations do not rely on the 
outcomes of previous or adjacent calculations, they are ideal for an HTC environment. 
In actual simulations, a single randomly selected site was seeded (status set to 
“infected”; all other sites pathogen-free but susceptible), after which spreading and 
containment actions were simulated on the network, and all relevant data stored upon 
outbreak termination or timeout. For each chosen ensemble of parameter settings, this 
procedure was repeated 10,000 times to ensure that, on average, over 99% of the 
network sites would be seeded at least once. Upon completion, each simulation 
produced a history file of outbreak statistics plus a site-based tally of inward and 
outward transmissions per type (595 and 111 GB in total). Post-processing of these 
raw data produced another 300 thousand files, including about forty thousand images 
of detection delay-dependent outbreak distributions. The latter mainly served as input 
for a dedicated viewer interface that allowed each relevant parameter to be altered 
separately, to visualise ceteris paribus effects. For statistical analyses and other plots 
we also relied on commercial software (Minitab 15, version 1.30.0 (2007), see 
http://www.minitab.com) and open-source freeware (Generic Mapping Tools, version 
4.1.4 (2006), see http://gmt.soest.hawaii.edu/). 
Table S1 lists all model parameters incorporated in the simulations. 
 
Table S1. Model parameters 
Parameter 
description 
Values References 
Local transmission 
likelihood per day 
( )[ ]Llocal Dp λβ 2exp −=  
05.0=β , 610−=Lλ  
See text (Network nodes and 
connections); Rodger & Mitchell 
2007 
Fomite 
transmission 
likelihood per day 
( )[ ]Ffomite Dp λγ 2exp −=  
005.0=γ , 610−=Fλ  
See text (Network nodes and 
connections); Chambers et al. 
2008; Tobback et al. 2007 
Transport 
transmission 
likelihood per day 
2524.365/Tptrans =  
 
See text (Network nodes and 
connections); Green et al. 2009; 
Munro & Gregory 2009; Munro et 
al. 2010; Skall et al. 2005 
Number of 
transports per year 
Mean number of yearly 
transports: 1.647272; 
range: 1 – 50 
Cefas Live Fish Movement 
database (see Thrush & Peeler 
2006 for background) 
River transmission 
likelihood per day 
[ ]Rriverp θλα −= exp  
005.0=α , 1=Rλ  
See text (Sites & transmissions; 
Supplement); Peeler et al. 2008; 
Skall et al. 2005; Taylor et al. 
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2010; Toranzo & Hetrick (1982); 
Barja et al. (1983); Murray et al. 
(2005); Kocan et al. (2001) 
Outbreak Severity 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10 (global 
transmission likelihood 
postfactor) 
Tobback et al. 2007; Peeler et al. 
2008; Algöet et al. 2009; Feist et 
al. 2002; Chambers et al. 2008 ; 
Sharkey et al. 2008 
Latency delay 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200 
days 
Algöet et al. 2009; Munro et al. 
2010; Ogut & Bishop 2007; 
Tobback et al. 2007 
Detection delay 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 
500, 1000 days 
See text (Delay parameters); 
Munro et al. 2010; Stone et al. 
2008; Algöet et al. 2009; Feist et 
al. 2002; Rodger & Mitchell 2007 
Culling delay 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50 days See text (Delay parameters); 
expert opinion 
Restocking delay 5, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 
500, 1000 days 
See text (Delay parameters); 
expert opinion 
Laboratory capacity 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500 See text (Control Strategies); 
Munro et al. 2010; Chambers et 
al. 2008 
Public awareness 
campaign (AC) 
Inactive, Active See text (Control Strategies); 
McLaws et al. 2007 
National Transport 
Ban (TB) 
0, 30 days Anonymous 2007; see text 
(Control Strategies); expert 
opinion 
Reactive / Proactive 
Ratio (Hybrid) 
10/1, 5/1, 5/2, 2/1, 1/1, 
1/2, 2/5, 1/5, 1/10 
See text (Control Strategies) 
Note: transmission parameter ranges are explored in the Supplementary section Sensitivity analysis 
below 
 
River stream flow 
Table S2 lists the 37 locations at which the USGS measured river stream flow speed 
sufficiently long (between 100 days and three years) to be included in the sample. The 
total number of data was initially 26,200, but this included some negative and zero 
velocities, possibly due to tidal inflows. Their removal left 25,088 positive stream 
velocities which were converted into meters per second. This sample size is ample for 
distribution fitting purposes. Geographical sampling favours Florida and Texas, with 
smaller contributions from Rhode Island, Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, and 
Oregon. All but six sites provided over one full year of continuous readings, limiting 
potential seasonal bias. The data were initially probability distribution-fitted using 
sixteen standard pdfs, but none passed the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit criterion 
at an acceptable significance level. Subsequently, data were binned (linear bins of 
width 0.1 m/s, offset 0.05, so centring on 0.1, 0.2, etc., bin range 0.1-4.4) to reveal a 
clear loglinear distribution (Figure 3 in main text). Log10(frequencies) per bin were 
least-squares fitted to yield the following loglinear frequency distribution equation: 
( ) ( )binfrequency 575.0521.3log10 −=  
which explains over 96% of observed variability; remaining residuals are 
approximately normally distributed (See Figure S1). Other bin widths and offsets 
yielded highly similar results. Overview of the relevant statistics: 
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Predictor      Coef  SE Coef       T      P 
Constant    3.52106  0.04577   76.93  0.000 
Slope      -0.57548  0.01772  -32.48  0.000 
S = 0.149224   R-Sq = 96.2%   R-Sq(adj) = 96.1% 
 
Analysis of Variance 
Source          DF      SS      MS        F      P 
Regression       1  23.497  23.497  1055.20  0.000 
Residual Error  42   0.935   0.022 
Total           43  24.432 
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Figure S1. A histogram of flow speed residuals after linear regression shows an approximate 
Gaussian distribution with some minor skewness toward right. 
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Figure S2. Histogram of the number of days a waterborne particle remains in river transit 
(based on the 2,232 river connections in the studied network). Most transits take less than two 
days. 
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Table S2. Sampled U.S. river sites providing >100 daily means of measured stream 
flow speed (sample size per site capped at three years of continuous readings) 
USGS code Data Location State 
01115833 750 BIG RIVER HARKNEY HILL RD NR COVENTRY CTR RI 
01490140 327 LITTLE BLACKWATER RIVER AT SEWARD MD 
02098198 270 HAW R BELOW B. EVERETT JORDAN DAM NR MONCURE NC 
02272500 101 KISSIMMEE RIVER AT US 98 AT FORT BASINGER FL 
02272502 108 KISSIMMEE RIVER AT LOCKETT EST AT FORT BASINGER FL 
02297100 222 JOSHUA CREEK AT NOCATEE FL 
02299472 714 BIG SLOUGH AT WEST PRICE BLVD NEAR NORTH PORT FL 
02299482 712 COCOPLUM WATERWAY AT NORTH PORT FL 
02299692 838 BLACKBURN CANAL NEAR VENICE FL 
02300082 971 FROG CREEK NEAR RUBONIA FL 
02310747 1025 CRYSTAL RIVER AT BAGLEY COVE NEAR CRYSTAL RIVER FL 
02313700 718 WACCASASSA RIVER NR GULF HAMMOCK FL 
02319300 767 WITHLACOOCHEE RIVER NR MADISON, FL 
02319302 1047 MADISON BLUE SPRING NR BLUE SPRINGS FL 
02319394 760 WITHLACOOCHEE RIVER NR LEE FL 
02322800 348 SANTA FE RIVER NR HILDRETH FL 
02323500 743 SUWANNEE RIVER NEAR WILCOX FL 
02323502 1054 FANNING SPRINGS NR WILCOX FL 
02323566 681 MANATEE SPRING NR CHIEFLAND FL 
02323592 756 SUWANNEE RIVER AB GOPHER RIVER NR SUWANNEE FL 
02326550 746 AUCILLA RIVER NR MOUTH NEAR NUTALL RISE FL 
02327022 1062 WAKULLA RIVER NEAR CRAWFORDVILLE FL 
02338500 718 CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER AT US 27, AT FRANKLIN GA 
02341505 1012 CHATTAHOOCHEE RIVER AT US 280, NEAR COLUMBUS GA 
02369600 1075 YELLOW RIVER NR MILTON FL 
02376033 751 ESCAMBIA RIVER NR MOLINO FL 
07346080 1037 BIG CYPRESS CK ABV SH 43 NR KARNACK TX 
08041749 702 PINE ISLAND BAYOU ABV BI PUMP PLANT, BEAUMONT TX 
08041780 526 NECHES RV SALTWATER BARRIER AT BEAUMONT TX 
08117300 965 BRAZOS RV AT GIWW FLOOD GATES NR FREEPORT TX 
08168913 690 COMAL RV (OC) NR LANDA LK, NEW BRAUNFELS TX 
08170990 878 JACOBS WELL SPG NR WIMBERLEY TX 
08211503 234 RINCON BAYOU CHANNEL NR CALALLEN TX 
14197900 1052 WILLAMETTE RIVER AT NEWBERG OR 
14211820 1041 COLUMBIA SLOUGH AT PORTLAND OR 
209303205 644 NEW RIVER BELOW HWY17 BRIDGE AT JACKSONVILLE NC 
21989773 155 SAVANNAH RIVER AT USACE DOCK, AT SAVANNAH GA 
Source: http://waterdata.usgs.gov/usa/nwis (surface water, daily data, parameter 55, in 
ft/sec) 
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Transmission histograms 
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Figure S3a. Frequency histograms of outward connections per site, for local transmissions. 
 
21181512963
500
400
300
200
100
0
FOMITE
Fr
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
Histogram of FOMITE
 
Figure S3b. Frequency histograms of outward connections per site, for fomite transmissions. 
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Figure S3c. Frequency histograms of outward connections per site, for river transmissions. 
 
 6 
120100806040200
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
TRANSPORT
Fr
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
Histogram of TRANSPORT
 
Figure S3d. Frequency histograms of outward connections per site, for transport 
transmissions. 
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Figure S4a. Histograms of proportion (in %) of total transmissions, per type, for the baseline 
results (all severity settings combined) 
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Figure S4b. Histograms of proportion (in %) of total transmissions, per type, for the reactive 
policy (all severity settings combined) 
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Figure S4c. Histograms of proportion (in %) of total transmissions, per type, for the proactive 
policy (all severity settings combined); the hybrid policy yields a similar image (see Figure 
S4f). 
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Figure S4d. Histograms of proportion (in %) of total transmissions, per type and severity, for 
the reactive policy 
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Figure S4e. Histograms of proportion (in %) of total transmissions, per type and severity, for 
the proactive policy 
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Figure S4f. Histograms of proportion (in %) of total transmissions, per type, for the hybrid 
policy (severity=5) 
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Contact structure histograms 
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Figure S5a. Degree distribution per site, for average (top panel) and maximum degree 
(bottom panel), when 50% of links selected at random have been removed. The Giant 
Strongly Connected Component (GSCC, comprising Giant Component plus its sink sites) is 
still completely intact. 
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Figure S5b. Degree distribution per site when 90% of links selected at random have been 
removed. Part of the GSCC has become fragmented into small clusters, giving rise to a 
second distribution on the extreme left, whereas path lengths within the GSCC have become 
much longer. 
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Figure S5c. Degree distribution per site when 95% of links selected at random have been 
removed. The GSCC has become smaller yet its path lengths have become even longer. The 
degree distribution of small clusters no longer overlaps at all with that of the GSCC to right of 
it, and a third entity of single sites (zero degree peak) has become dominant. 
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Sensitivity Analysis 
The sensitivity of results to changes in relative likelihood of specific transmission 
types was investigated by running a series of 1,176 baseline simulations (10,000 
seedings each; fixed latency delay of 50 days; no biosecurity controls in place; each 
outbreak allowed to spread for thirty years without any intervention). For 
convenience, we recall the four transmission likelihoods, given recorded transports 
per year T, stochastically reconstructed river transit times in days θ , and Euclidean 
distance D in meters between sites, based on their Ordnance Survey grid coordinates, 
and other parameters as follows: 
2524.365/Tptrans =  
[ ]Rriverp θλα −= exp , 005.0=α , 1=Rλ  ( )[ ]Llocal Dp λβ 2exp −= , 05.0=β , 610−=Lλ  ( )[ ]Ffomite Dp λγ 2exp −= , 005.0=γ , 610−=Fλ . 
For each pairing of two out of these four transmission types (i.e., six permutations: 
local-river, local-transport, local-fomite, river-transport, river-fomite, and transport-
fomite), we first explored a two-dimensional parameter space, by independently 
varying T, α , β , orγ  respectively, in a multiplier range from 0.1 to 10 in seven steps 
(0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10), yielding 49 points per pairing. We ran simulations for 
severity factors 1, 2, and 5, and plotted the results per severity value in a half-matrix 
of all pair combinations (Figure S6a-c), using a fixed linear colour scale for the 
average outbreak size (range: 0-300), and log-log axes for the respective probability 
post-factors. Each panel thus represents a two-dimensional section through a four-
dimensional space; the central point in each plane corresponds with the actual 
operative settings of the simulator in normal runs. 
 The same general pattern is recovered for each of the three global severity 
factors tested, albeit with higher absolute outbreak sizes. Results are most sensitive to 
changes in the transport likelihood, and least affected by fomite transmissions. 
Between these two extremes, changes in the river transmission likelihood are more 
influential than those in local transmissibility (seen most clearly in the top left panel 
of Figure S6c). Thus outbreak size is most sensitive to changes in likelihood of the 
two types of directed links, which are empirically best constrained. These links are 
also associated with the fewest source sites, suggesting that targeted biosecurity 
should be highly effective in this network. 
 Secondly, we investigated the sensitivity of results to the two λ scalars for the 
two undirected transmission types incorporated in our simulations. Again we 
separately investigated severity factors 1, 2, and 5, using the same plotting scheme as 
previously. Note, however, that the effect of these scalars is reversed with respect to 
the previous case, i.e., scalars larger than unity result in smaller transmission 
likelihoods and vice versa. Figure S6d shows that the sensitivity of results is almost 
completely dominated by the local Lλ  for values smaller than 0.5, but for larger ones, 
the fomite Fλ  becomes increasingly important. When Lλ  reaches a factor 10, results 
become predominantly sensitive to changes in Fλ  when the latter exceeds unity. As in 
the previous case, raising the outbreak severity causes a shift in absolute outbreak 
sizes, but the spatial pattern remains largely unchanged. 
 Thirdly, we separately studied the relative effect of changes in the two river 
scalars, i.e., plotting average outbreak size for the two-dimensional section of the 
average transmission rate α  versus the river transit time scalar Rλ  (Figure S6e). As 
 14 
before, each variable was altered within a range of two orders of magnitude around 
the value used in actual simulations, testing each of 49 combinations per panel with 
10,000 seedings each, without any controls in place, for severity factors 1,2, and 5. 
Note that outbreak size tends to increase with larger α  and smaller Rλ  respectively. 
Apart from larger absolute values, the relative distribution of outbreak sizes is again 
largely insensitive to choices of severity; it furthermore shows that results are mostly 
affected by changes in α , whereas only the smallest values of Rλ  make an 
appreciable contribution to larger outbreak sizes. 
 Finally, the relative contributions to outbreak size of each of the eight factors 
considered (four premultipliers, three distance-related scalars, plus outbreak severity) 
were quantified statistically using a General Linear Model, which is an appropriate 
procedure for unbalanced fixed factors, as is the case here (a fully balanced design as 
applied elsewhere proved computationally too expensive to pursue). All fixed factors 
explore seven values (0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2, 5, and 10) except severity (settings: 1, 2, and 
5). From the output reproduced below, one can glean that over 83% of all variability 
in the investigated continuous response variable (average outbreak size) is explained 
by the eight factors considered, and that no superfluous factors have been included (as 
R-sq(adj) is almost as large as the original R-sq). The two most important columns are 
the adjusted sum of squares (Adj. SS) and the p-value (rightmost column). The latter 
indicates that effects of the two fomite factors (γ  and Fλ ) and Rλ  (waterborne 
pathogen decay rate) are not statistically significant for any reasonable confidence 
level chosen. Of the remaining factors (aside from severity), changes in transport 
transmission likelihood affect the outbreak size most, followed by the local area scalar 
Lλ  and the river transmission rate α ; the contribution of the local transmission rate 
β  is much smaller. For an explanation of the various column headings, see the 
section on balanced ANOVA below. 
 
 
 
Analysis of Variance for OUTAV1, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
 
Source    DF   Seq SS   Adj SS   Adj MS        F      P 
BETA       6   121793   116277    19379    14.00  0.000 
ALPHA      6   379372   331510    55252    39.92  0.000 
T          6  2986979  2999833   499972   361.21  0.000 
GAMMA      6    15333     5138      856     0.62  0.716* 
LAMBDA_L   6   496689   442541    73757    53.29  0.000 
LAMBDA_F   6    11259    10899     1817     1.31  0.248* 
LAMBDA_R   6    12363    12363     2061     1.49  0.179* 
SEVERITY   2  4004873  4004873  2002436  1446.69  0.000 
Error   1131  1565477  1565477     1384 
Total   1175  9594137 
S = 37.2042   R-Sq = 83.68%   R-Sq(adj) = 83.05% 
* = not significant 
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Figure S6a. Sensitivity analysis for baseline results (no control measures, 30-year timespan, 
latency delay: 50 days) for severity factor 1. Average outbreak size (colour scale with contour 
lines) for six panels of transmission likelihood pairs (log-log scale), independently varied by 
two orders of magnitude each (49 grid points per panel, 10,000 seedings per point). 
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Figure S6b. Sensitivity analysis for baseline results for severity factor 2. 
 
 
Figure S6c. Sensitivity analysis for baseline results for severity factor 5. 
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Figure S6d. Sensitivity of average outbreak size of baseline results for severity factors 1,2, 
and 5 (left to right), given changes in local and fomite distance scalars. Same colour scale and 
resolution as in previous figure (49 grid points per panel, 10,000 seedings per point).  
 
 
 
Figure S6e. Sensitivity of average outbreak size of baseline results for severity factors 1,2, 
and 5 (left to right), given changes in the two river transmission scalars. Same colour scale 
and resolution as in previous figures (49 grid points per panel, 10,000 seedings per point).  
 
Kruskal-Wallis analysis of transmission totals 
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a nonparametric alternative to one-way ANOVA (which 
assumes a Gaussian parent distribution). It is used to assess whether the medians from 
two independently sampled populations (or two population subsets) are equal (H0 
hypothesis) or significantly different (H1). The only additional assumption made is 
that both sampled populations have continuous distributions with similar shape. Given 
some response variable, results quantify the response’s median for each subset, the 
average rank of the subset, their Z-score relative to the overall averaged rank, and the 
P-value or likelihood that any observed differences are due to chance. If P is less than 
or equal to the predetermined alpha level (here we use 5%, i.e., the 95% confidence 
interval), the subset distinction expresses significant differences in medians. 
We applied Kruskal-Wallis to the number of inward and outward links per site 
(per transmission type and combined) for the subset of fish farms versus that of 
fisheries, to determine whether their respective network architecture is significantly 
different (Table S3). We also ran simulations for each of the three main containment 
strategies (100,000 seedings each, no additional containment controls, severity = 5, 
laboratory capacity = 50 tests per year, hybrid ratio 1/1), to compare with one another, 
and with the network architecture result. With the exception of two inward transport 
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transmission totals (for proactive and hybrid policy), all remaining 38 tests confirmed 
that fish farms and fisheries should be considered different entities, both in network 
architecture and recorded transmissions. In terms of links, outward transport is most 
distinctive (see Z-scores in Table S3), followed by inward transport and inward river 
transmissions. Outward links represent most of the overall differences. In comparison 
with reactive controls, the two contact-tracing policies exacerbate measured 
differences in outward transmissions, but lessen those in inward transmissions. Based 
on these findings, fish farms can be seen from a biosecurity perspective as high-risk 
senders, both to other fish farms (via transport and river contacts) and to fisheries 
(transport), whereas fishery sites are primarily at risk as receivers. Table S4 of link 
statistics per site type moreover shows that fish farms tend on average to reside in 
areas with higher site density, increasing the number of local and fomite infection 
routes. Furthermore, all transport links originate at fish farms. 
 
Table S3. Kruskal-Wallis tests of links and transmission totals per policy: medians 
per subset, mean ranks per subset, Z-score and p-value, for 1855 fisheries (left) and 
235 fish farms (right) 
  Links Reactive Proactive Hybrid 
In 
30; 33 
1031; 1160 
3.10; 0.002 
0; 0 
1024; 1213 
4;51; 0.000 
1; 9 
1026; 1204 
4.26; 0.000 
0; 2 
1026; 1203 
4.25; 0.000 Local 
Out 
30; 33 
1031; 1160 
3.10; 0.000 
0; 0 
1022; 1232 
5.02; 0.000 
0; 10 
1019; 1252 
5.56; 0.000 
0; 2 
1021; 1238 
5.19; 0.000 
In 
2; 2 
1021; 1240 
5.24; 0.000 
0; 0 
1034; 1134 
2.39; 0.000 
0; 1 
1030; 1167 
3.28; 0.001 
0; 0 
1029; 1179 
3.60; 0.000 Fomite 
Out 
2; 2 
1021;1240 
5;24; 0.000 
0; 0 
1028; 1185 
3.75; 0.017 
0; 1 
1022; 1232 
5.02; 0.000 
0; 0 
1025; 1206 
4.32; 0.000 
In 
0; 1 
1010; 1327 
7.59; 0.000 
0; 0 
1012; 1314 
7.23; 0.000 
0; 3 
1014; 1297 
6.79; 0.000 
0; 1 
1014; 1298 
6.82; 0.000 River 
Out 
0; 0 
1020; 1248 
5.46; 0.000 
0; 0 
1012; 1314 
4.76; 0.000 
0; 0 
1018; 1266 
5.95; 0.000 
0; 0 
1019; 1257 
5.69; 0.000 
In 
1; 2 
1007; 1352 
8.27; 0.000 
1; 3 
1006; 1359 
8.46; 0.000 
112; 115 
1042; 1072 
0.70; 0.482* 
14; 16 
1037; 1109 
1.72; 0.086* Transport 
Out 
0; 4 
949; 1811 
20.65; 0.000 
0; 5 
958; 1740 
18.73; 0.000 
0; 147 
951; 1791 
20.11; 0.000 
0; 21 
951; 1791 
20.11; 0.000 
In 
33; 39 
1023; 1225 
4.85; 0.000 
2; 11 
997; 1428 
10.32; 0.000 
182; 296 
1018; 1260 
5.80; 0.000 
23; 45 
1012; 1307 
7.05; 0.000 Total 
Out 
32; 48 
1003;1385 
9.14; 0.000 
0; 16 
974; 1605 
15.07; 0.000 
2; 317 
968; 1654 
16.41; 0.000 
0; 47 
971; 1635 
15.89; 0.000 
Note: severity=5 for all policies; overall mean rank: 1045.5; * = H1 rejected 
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Table S4. Number of links per site type (mean, Q1/Q2/Q3) 
Transmission 
type 
Fisheries 
(1855) 
Fish farms 
(235) 
All sites 
(2090) 
In 33.098 20/30/41 
39.40 
22/33/47 
33.806 
21/30/41 Local 
Out 33.098 20/30/41 
39.40 
22/33/47 
33.806 
21/30/41 
In 2.3456 0/2/3 
3.630 
1/2/4 
2.49 
1/2/3 Fomite 
Out 2.3456 0/2/3 
3.630 
1/2/4 
2/49 
1/2/3 
In 0.9391 0/0/1 
2.085 
0/1/3 
1.0679 
0/0/1 River 
Out 0.9876 0/0/1 
1.702 
0/0/2 
1.0679 
0/0/1 
In 1.1822 1/1/1 
2.370 
1/2/3 
1.316 
1/1/1 Transport 
Out 0 0/0/0 
11.70 
1/4/13 
1.316 
0/0/0 
In 37.564 23/33/45 
47.48 
25/39/56 
38.679 
23/34/46 Total 
Out 36.431 22/32/44 
56.43 
25/39/56 
38.679 
23/34/46 
Note: Q1, Q3 = 1st, 3rd quartile, Q2 = median 
 
 
Geographic Risk Maps per policy 
Long simulations of 100,000 seedings each were run for each of the three main 
control policies, with the following fixed parameter settings: severity factor 5; latency 
delay 5 days; detection delay 100 days, culling delay 10 days, restocking delay 100 
days. For proactive and hybrid policies, the laboratory capacity was limited to 50 
conclusive site tests per year; for the hybrid policy a reactive / proactive ratio of 1/1 
was chosen. Inward and outward transmissions were stored separately per site, 
averaged per river catchment, and the latter transformed by computing their natural 
log. The largest overall value of ln(4440.4) then provided the maximum for a range of 
15 equal-width bins, with negative log-values moved into the first bin, and empty bins 
being allocated to an additional zero bin. Figures S7a-c display geographic risk per 
catchment, per policy. A clear discrepancy between outward (more concentrated) and 
inward transmissions pervades all plots. Risk in the proactive policy is most severe 
and most widespread. However, in contrast to the average and maximum outbreak 
statistics computed over entire ensembles of delay parameters, this particular 
realisation (with medium-high severity) shows the hybrid strategy to result in higher 
risk than the reactive policy. Some specific (relative) high-risk catchments can be 
identified in all three plots. 
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Figure S7a. Geographic risk distribution per catchment, for the reactive policy. Fixed colour 
scale, levels 0-15. Left: outward transmissions. Right: inward transmissions. 
 
 
 
 
Figure S7b. Geographic risk distribution per catchment, for the proactive policy. Fixed 
colour scale, levels 0-15. Left: outward transmissions. Right: inward transmissions. 
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Figure S7c. Geographic risk distribution per catchment, for the hybrid policy. Fixed colour 
scale, levels 0-15. Left: outward transmissions. Right: inward transmissions. 
 
 
Balanced ANOVA results 
Given the balanced design of parameter (or “factor”) combinations explored in the 
simulations (i.e., the number of observations for each combination of the various 
factor levels is the same), balanced ANOVA is an appropriate statistical technique to 
examine the effects of multiple factors on several continuous response variables such 
as average and maximum outbreak size, duration, and the number of endemic 
outbreaks. Note that the maximum outbreak size is the largest outbreak recorded per 
10,000 seedings; this is not necessarily an endemic outbreak (stopped by timeout after 
thirty years of simulated time); if no endemic outbreaks were recorded in a sample, 
the maximum represents the largest number of sites ever infected after a single 
seeding. 
Balanced ANOVA differs from General Linear Models (Munro et al. 2010), 
which allows for unbalanced data, and from fully-nested ANOVA, which requires a 
hierarchical design and assumes that all factors are randomly drawn. By contrast, in 
this study all factors (parameters) are considered fixed, i.e., they are discrete variables 
that are altered systematically. ANOVA then examines whether the factor level means 
are significantly different from each other, and quantifies respective factor 
contributions to the studied response. 
 ANOVA procedures assume, and we tested to confirm, that errors are 
independent and approximately normally distributed with zero mean, and that error 
variance is itself invariant for different factor terms. We did find that response 
variables tended to depart somewhat from normality in producing heavier distribution 
tails (i.e., more large values than predicted by a Gaussian pdf). To correct for this, we 
applied the Box-Cox transformation to all response variables to stabilise their variance 
prior to ANOVA. These results are the ones presented below. However, when we 
compared these outputs to those based on the original responses we found no 
appreciable differences in the conclusions drawn. We also tested for, but did not find, 
marked interaction effects between different factor pairs. All of the above, in 
combination with the large sample sizes acquired, suggest that the performed analyses 
are robust. 
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The relevance of specific factors is quantified as follows. For each continuous 
response variable evaluated, balanced ANOVA yields a list of all factors considered. 
Per factor it computes the degrees of freedom (DF), the sum of squares (SS), the mean 
squares (MS), the F statistic, and the probability (P). The DF expresses how much 
independent information is available to calculate each SS; the SS quantifies the total 
amount of variation in the response explained by the factor; the MS does the same per 
factor level (MS = SS / DF); the F statistic is used to determine the p-value. The latter 
represents the probability of obtaining results as extreme (or greater) in the absence of 
a real effect. Thus given some alpha-level of desired significance (here we use 0.05, 
i.e., a 95% one-sided confidence limit), any p-value above it implies that the effect is 
not significant, and is rejected. In the results tabulated below (and elsewhere), a p-
value of zero indicates a true value below 0.0005. 
The complete analysis per response variable is quantified in terms of S, R2, and 
adjusted R2. The first term (S) is the square root of the mean-squared-residual-error, 
quantifying remaining data variance after the relationship between the response and 
the predictors has been taken into account. The coefficient of determination R-
Sq(uared) expresses the percentage of variation in the response explained by the 
predictors. Table S5 presents this measure for the listed balanced ANOVA results, 
showing that all ensembles explain more than half of all observed variation in up to 
seven different response variables. Remaining variability may be due to the identity of 
the seeding site, as well as dynamic interactions between the changing outbreak 
configuration, selected contingency measures, and delay parameters. We note that R-
Sq can be artificially high if unnecessary factors are included. To test for this, the 
adjusted R-Sq modifies the overall R-Sq for the included number of factors. A large 
decrease in adjusted R-Sq with respect to the original R-Sq would imply that 
unnecessary factors are present. However, results clearly show that all considered 
factors are relevant. In the following tables, the factor “awareness” designates the 
public awareness campaign (halving all detection delays after the first one); TB 
indicates the national transport ban (in force for 30 days, plus possible extension 
whenever new infected sites are discovered within that period). The raw output tables 
are followed by a brief summary. 
 
Table S5. Percentage of variance explained per response measure 
 Baseline Reactive Proactive Hybrid 
Average outbreak 
size (all seedings) 99.58% 91.14% 80.01% 82.00% 
Average outbreak 
size (subset) 99.56% 92.31% 75.25% 67.61% 
Maximum 
outbreak size 99.88% 95.58% 69.70% 57.36% 
Number of 
endemic outbreaks n/a 69.67% 82.09% 70.43% 
Average outbreak 
duration n/a 93.46% 92.07% 77.17% 
Average lab queue 
length n/a n/a 72.64% 69.38% 
Wasted laboratory 
capacity n/a n/a 54.23% 61.82% 
n/a = not applicable 
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Balanced ANOVA results for: Baseline tests 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Average outbreak size (all seedings) 
Source   DF      SS     MS        F      P 
LATENCY   5    2112    422     8.51  0.000 
SEVERITY  5  291229  58246  1173.74  0.000 
Error    25    1241     50 
Total    35  294581 
S = 7.04445   R-Sq = 99.58%   R-Sq(adj) = 99.41% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Average outbreak size (excluding outbreaks 
of one single site) 
Source   DF      SS      MS        F      P 
LATENCY   5    7912    1582     9.30  0.000 
SEVERITY  5  964171  192834  1133.68  0.000 
Error    25    4252     170 
Total    35  976335 
S = 13.0421   R-Sq = 99.56%   R-Sq(adj) = 99.39% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Maximum outbreak size 
Source   DF       SS       MS        F      P 
LATENCY   5    19499     3900     8.98  0.000 
SEVERITY  5  9106796  1821359  4194.32  0.000 
Error    25    10856      434 
Total    35  9137151 
S = 20.8385   R-Sq = 99.88%   R-Sq(adj) = 99.83% 
 
 
Balanced ANOVA results for: Reactive policy 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Average outbreak size (all seedings) 
Source         DF       SS      MS         F      P 
DETECTION       7  5189.47  741.35  71639.15  0.000 
LATENCY         5     0.07    0.01      1.43  0.210* not significant 
CULLING         5     2.33    0.47     45.11  0.000 
RESTOCKING      7     3.87    0.55     53.49  0.000 
SEVERITY        5   675.41  135.08  13053.44  0.000 
TB              1     2.31    2.31    223.31  0.000 
AWARENESS       1     8.98    8.98    867.87  0.000 
Error       55264   571.90    0.01 
Total       55295  6454.36 
S = 0.101727   R-Sq = 91.14%   R-Sq(adj) = 91.13% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Average outbreak size (excluding outbreaks 
of one single site) 
Source         DF       SS      MS         F      P 
DETECTION       7  689.955  98.565  83779.80  0.000 
LATENCY         5    0.012   0.002      2.03  0.071* not significant 
CULLING         5    0.206   0.041     35.10  0.000 
RESTOCKING      7    0.819   0.117     99.40  0.000 
SEVERITY        5   86.526  17.305  14709.35  0.000 
TB              1    0.673   0.673    571.94  0.000 
AWARENESS       1    2.193   2.193   1864.43  0.000 
Error       55264   65.017   0.001 
Total       55295  845.402 
S = 0.0342998   R-Sq = 92.31%   R-Sq(adj) = 92.31% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Maximum outbreak size 
Source         DF        SS       MS          F      P 
DETECTION       7  1605.654  229.379  147029.75  0.000 
LATENCY         5     0.052    0.010       6.71  0.000 
CULLING         5     0.806    0.161     103.32  0.000 
RESTOCKING      7     1.763    0.252     161.45  0.000 
SEVERITY        5   242.285   48.457   31060.46  0.000 
TB              1     1.636    1.636    1048.36  0.000 
AWARENESS       1    10.008   10.008    6414.98  0.000 
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Error       55264    86.217    0.002 
Total       55295  1948.420 
S = 0.0394979   R-Sq = 95.58%   R-Sq(adj) = 95.57% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Number of endemic outbreaks 
Source         DF       SS      MS         F      P 
DETECTION       7  4999.82  714.26  16163.12  0.000 
LATENCY         5    34.56    6.91    156.43  0.000 
CULLING         5     0.06    0.01      0.28  0.925* not significant 
RESTOCKING      7   106.53   15.22    344.38  0.000 
SEVERITY        5   321.26   64.25   1453.99  0.000 
TB              1     0.76    0.76     17.22  0.000 
AWARENESS       1   146.97  146.97   3325.77  0.000 
Error       55264  2442.15    0.04 
Total       55295  8052.12 
S = 0.210216   R-Sq = 69.67%   R-Sq(adj) = 69.65% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Average outbreak duration (excluding 
outbreaks of one single site and endemic outbreaks) 
Source         DF        SS       MS         F      P 
DETECTION       7   78.0408  11.1487  91514.90  0.000 
LATENCY         5   16.9639   3.3928  27849.93  0.000 
CULLING         5    0.8064   0.1613   1323.95  0.000 
RESTOCKING      7    0.0314   0.0045     36.85  0.000 
SEVERITY           5    0.2028   0.0406    332.95  0.000 
TB              1    0.0006   0.0006      5.13  0.024 
AWARENESS       1    0.1094   0.1094    897.79  0.000 
Error       55264    6.7325   0.0001 
Total       55295  102.8878 
S = 0.0110374   R-Sq = 93.46%   R-Sq(adj) = 93.45% 
 
 
Balanced ANOVA results for: Proactive policy 
  
Analysis of Variance for: Average outbreak size (all seedings) 
Source          DF        SS       MS         F      P 
DETECTION        7   7167.45  1023.92  43263.53  0.000 
LATENCY          5     57.32    11.46    484.36  0.000 
CULLING          5    658.73   131.75   5566.64  0.000 
RESTOCKING       7    157.46    22.49    950.47  0.000 
SEVERITY         5   5919.49  1183.90  50023.06  0.000 
LAB              5   1286.25   257.25  10869.53  0.000 
TB               1    465.53   465.53  19669.80  0.000 
Error       165852   3925.23     0.02 
Total       165887  19637.46 
S = 0.153841   R-Sq = 80.01%   R-Sq(adj) = 80.01% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Average outbreak size (excluding outbreaks 
of one single site) 
Source          DF       SS      MS         F      P 
DETECTION        7   756.83  108.12   9428.08  0.000 
LATENCY          5    56.91   11.38    992.58  0.000 
CULLING          5   518.84  103.77   9048.68  0.000 
RESTOCKING       7   131.24   18.75   1634.96  0.000 
SEVERITY         5  2600.04  520.01  45345.53  0.000 
LAB              5  1347.40  269.48  23499.16  0.000 
TB               1   372.15  372.15  32452.03  0.000 
Error       165852  1901.94    0.01 
Total       165887  7685.34 
S = 0.107087   R-Sq = 75.25%   R-Sq(adj) = 75.25% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Maximum outbreak size 
Source          DF        SS      MS         F      P 
DETECTION        7   11220.9  1603.0   7772.87  0.000 
LATENCY          5     890.3   178.1    863.45  0.000 
CULLING          5    8939.3  1787.9   8669.31  0.000 
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RESTOCKING       7    2570.4   367.2   1780.58  0.000 
SEVERITY         5   36419.9  7284.0  35319.87  0.000 
LAB              5   10699.2  2139.8  10376.07  0.000 
TB               1    7936.4  7936.4  38483.48  0.000 
Error       165852   34203.5     0.2 
Total       165887  112880.1 
S = 0.454124   R-Sq = 69.70%   R-Sq(adj) = 69.69% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Number of endemic outbreaks 
Source          DF       SS      MS         F      P 
DETECTION        7  2185.65  312.24  47019.15  0.000 
LATENCY          5    24.98    5.00    752.22  0.000 
CULLING          5   330.87   66.17   9964.94  0.000 
RESTOCKING       7    18.51    2.64    398.12  0.000 
SEVERITY         5  1266.03  253.21  38130.00  0.000 
LAB              5  1210.66  242.13  36462.18  0.000 
TB               1    12.81   12.81   1929.73  0.000 
Error       165852  1101.36    0.01 
Total       165887  6150.87 
S = 0.0814900   R-Sq = 82.09%   R-Sq(adj) = 82.09% 
 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Average outbreak duration (excluding 
outbreaks of one single site and endemic outbreaks) 
Source          DF        SS       MS          F      P 
DETECTION        7   41294.9   5899.3  112055.05  0.000 
LATENCY          5    1955.1    391.0    7427.23  0.000 
CULLING          5    1992.0    398.4    7567.46  0.000 
RESTOCKING       7       6.1      0.9      16.47  0.000 
SEVERITY         5     405.6     81.1    1540.86  0.000 
LAB              5   55710.3  11142.1  211640.24  0.000 
TB               1       7.4      7.4     140.11  0.000 
Error       165852    8731.5      0.1 
Total       165887  110102.8 
S = 0.229448   R-Sq = 92.07%   R-Sq(adj) = 92.07% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Average length of the site-testing queue 
Source          DF        SS      MS         F      P 
DETECTION        7   28.9408  4.1344  17207.56  0.000 
LATENCY          5    0.0041  0.0008      3.40  0.005 
CULLING          5   31.7197  6.3439  26403.80  0.000 
RESTOCKING       7    0.0027  0.0004      1.61  0.128* not significant 
SEVERITY         5    6.7407  1.3481   5611.04  0.000 
LAB              5   38.3694  7.6739  31939.04  0.000 
TB               1    0.0030  0.0030     12.31  0.000 
Error       165852   39.8486  0.0002 
Total       165887  145.6289 
S = 0.0155005   R-Sq = 72.64%   R-Sq(adj) = 72.63% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: wasted laboratory capacity (negative tests) 
Source          DF       SS      MS         F      P 
DETECTION        7   43.477   6.211   2910.66  0.000 
LATENCY          5    3.131   0.626    293.42  0.000 
CULLING          5  204.556  40.911  19172.20  0.000 
RESTOCKING       7    4.159   0.594    278.42  0.000 
SEVERITY         5   51.190  10.238   4797.87  0.000 
LAB              5  107.045  21.409  10032.93  0.000 
TB               1    5.845   5.845   2739.02  0.000 
Error       165852  353.908   0.002 
Total       165887  773.311 
S = 0.0461939   R-Sq = 54.23%   R-Sq(adj) = 54.23% 
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Balanced ANOVA results for: Hybrid policy 
  
Analysis of Variance for: Average outbreak size (all seedings) 
Source          DF        SS      MS         F      P 
DETECTION        7   6984.04  997.72  51618.73  0.000 
LATENCY          5    558.78  111.76   5781.86  0.000 
CULLING          5    539.52  107.90   5582.63  0.000 
RESTOCKING       7      2.67    0.38     19.75  0.000 
LAB              5   2498.92  499.78  25857.16  0.000 
RATIO            8    367.77   45.97   2378.43  0.000 
Error       124378   2404.06    0.02 
Total       124415  13355.76 
S = 0.139027   R-Sq = 82.00%   R-Sq(adj) = 81.99% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Average outbreak size (excluding outbreaks 
of one single site) 
Source          DF       SS      MS         F      P 
DETECTION        7   779.53  111.36   7488.34  0.000 
LATENCY          5   505.22  101.04   6794.51  0.000 
CULLING          5   458.75   91.75   6169.64  0.000 
RESTOCKING       7     1.68    0.24     16.16  0.000 
LAB              5  1829.35  365.87  24602.44  0.000 
RATIO            8   285.62   35.70   2400.73  0.000 
Error       124378  1849.66    0.01 
Total       124415  5709.80 
S = 0.121948   R-Sq = 67.61%   R-Sq(adj) = 67.60% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Maximum outbreak size 
Source          DF        SS       MS        F      P 
DETECTION        7   89273.0  12753.3  6979.76  0.000 
LATENCY          5   43262.0   8652.4  4735.39  0.000 
CULLING          5   73834.5  14766.9  8081.79  0.000 
RESTOCKING       7      77.4     11.1     6.05  0.000 
LAB              5   87369.1  17473.8  9563.27  0.000 
RATIO            8   11949.4   1493.7   817.47  0.000 
Error       124378  227261.1      1.8 
Total       124415  533026.5 
S = 1.35173   R-Sq = 57.36%   R-Sq(adj) = 57.35% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Number of endemic outbreaks 
Source          DF       SS      MS         F      P 
DETECTION        7  2048.51  292.64  12350.18  0.000 
LATENCY          5   638.52  127.70   5389.41  0.000 
CULLING          5  1257.65  251.53  10615.10  0.000 
RESTOCKING       7     1.80    0.26     10.84  0.000 
LAB              5  2647.18  529.44  22343.23  0.000 
RATIO            8   425.04   53.13   2242.17  0.000 
Error       124378  2947.21    0.02 
Total       124415  9965.90 
S = 0.153934   R-Sq = 70.43%   R-Sq(adj) = 70.42% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Average outbreak duration (excluding 
outbreaks of one single site and endemic outbreaks) 
Source          DF        SS       MS         F      P 
DETECTION        7  12070.74  1724.39  32010.34  0.000 
LATENCY          5    312.17    62.43   1158.96  0.000 
CULLING          5    826.42   165.28   3068.20  0.000 
RESTOCKING       7      0.36     0.05      0.95  0.466* not significant 
LAB              5   8285.10  1657.02  30759.70  0.000 
RATIO            8   1153.20   144.15   2675.90  0.000 
Error       124378   6700.22     0.05 
Total       124415  29348.20 
S = 0.232099   R-Sq = 77.17%   R-Sq(adj) = 77.16% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: Average length of the site-testing queue 
Source          DF        SS       MS         F      P 
DETECTION        7   315.865   45.124  10113.81  0.000 
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LATENCY          5    31.737    6.347   1422.66  0.000 
CULLING          5   565.687  113.137  25358.12  0.000 
RESTOCKING       7     0.001    0.000      0.03  1.000* not significant 
LAB              5   287.060   57.412  12868.09  0.000 
RATIO            8    57.110    7.139   1600.06  0.000 
Error       124378   554.923    0.004 
Total       124415  1812.382 
S = 0.0667951   R-Sq = 69.38%   R-Sq(adj) = 69.37% 
 
Analysis of Variance for: wasted laboratory capacity (negative tests) 
Source          DF        SS       MS         F      P 
DETECTION        7   261.780   37.397   3570.34  0.000 
LATENCY          5   168.035   33.607   3208.50  0.000 
CULLING          5   943.306  188.661  18011.67  0.000 
RESTOCKING       7     0.624    0.089      8.50  0.000 
LAB              5   433.971   86.794   8286.33  0.000 
RATIO            8   301.971   37.746   3603.69  0.000 
Error       124378  1302.783    0.010 
Total       124415  3412.470 
S = 0.102344   R-Sq = 61.82%   R-Sq(adj) = 61.81% 
 
 
Summarising the reactive case, the detection delay is by far the most important factor 
affecting average and maximum outbreak size, outweighing even outbreak severity. A 
distant third is the public awareness campaign (AC), followed by minor contributions 
from the restocking delay, the national transport ban (TB), and the culling delay; 
latency delay appears to have little effect here. For endemic outbreaks, the top two 
remain unchanged, but restocking is here almost as influential as the AC, followed by 
latency. Outbreak durations (for non-endemic outbreaks larger than a single site) are 
almost exclusively determined by detection and latency (in that order), with a tiny 
contribution from the culling delay. Thus a higher global transmission likelihood (the 
severity parameter) has hardly any effect on how long an outbreak lasts, although it 
does occasion a general shift towards more endemic outbreaks. Comparing the two 
additional measures, the AC consistently exceeds the TB in efficacy. 
 The proactive strategy offers a more complex picture. Starting with mean 
outbreak size, the severity factor is almost par with detection (most influential) when 
the average is computed over all seedings, and it achieves first ranking when 
excluding single-site outbreaks. In the latter case, lab capacity is the second most 
important factor (otherwise third). Of the other delay parameters, culling ends highest, 
and even more so when assessing maximum outbreak size. The TB has a minor effect, 
followed by restocking and latency. The number of endemic outbreaks relies as 
previously on the detection delay. The outbreak severity multiplier and lab capacity 
have about equal effect on this response, followed by culling. Furthermore, outbreak 
duration is foremost a function of lab capacity, followed by detection and minor 
contributions from latency and culling. The average length of the site-testing queue is 
affected most by the lab capacity, but the culling delay is close behind, followed by 
detection. The response measure of the number of negative laboratory tests (i.e., 
wasted capacity) yields a similar profile, but with outbreak severity as an added 
influence. Remaining parameters have little effect. 
 Finally, the hybrid policy (tested at severity factor five only) is to first order 
determined by detection delay and lab capacity. Detection is most influential for 
average outbreak size (all seedings) and duration; available testing resources are most 
relevant for large and endemic outbreaks; for maximum outbreak size their effects are 
roughly equal. Next in line, latency and culling delay yield similar contributions to the 
two outbreak size averages, but culling has the advantage in all other response 
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variables. Overall, the hybrid-specific ratio of reactive versus proactive detections 
represents a minor contribution, whereas the restocking delay has virtually no effect. 
 We separately tested for the presence of parameter interaction, i.e., when the 
response at a factor level strongly depends on the levels of other factors. For this we 
plotted the means for each level of a factor while a second factor was kept constant. 
Parallel lines (but not necessarily horizontal or overlapping) indicate no interaction. 
Three examples are shown. In the reactive example of average outbreak size (all 
seedings) we find some weak interaction for the highest detection delay only (1,000 
days), with the highest culling delay (one point) and low restocking delays 
respectively. All other level combinations of all parameters do not appear to interact 
at all. Similar states are found in the proactive case (number of endemic outbreaks) 
and the hybrid example (average outbreak duration); very mild interactions affect the 
largest detection delay for largest culling delay and smallest restocking delay. 
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Figure S8a. Interaction plot for average outbreak size (all seedings) in the reactive policy 
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Figure S8b. Interaction plot for the number of endemic outbreaks in the proactive policy 
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Figure S8c. Interaction plot for average outbreak duration (single-site and endemic outbreaks 
excluded) in the hybrid policy 
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Main Effects 
Within the context of ANOVA, a “main effect” occurs when the mean response 
changes significantly across the levels of a considered factor. It is commonly 
evaluated in a plot of the line-connected response mean for each factor level, relative 
to a horizontal reference of the overall response mean. If all plotted points coincide 
with this horizontal, a main effect is absent for this factor. The greater the slope of a 
plotted line segment, the larger the effect across the two factor levels that define that 
segment. Comparing slopes of different factors indicates their relative strength in 
affecting the response. Thus main effects plots help to quickly identify which factors 
(and which factor levels) influence a chosen response the most. However, whether a 
perceived pattern is statistically significant has to be evaluated separately (see 
Balanced ANOVA results). Here we present five examples (Figures S9a-e) for 
outbreak size and duration, followed by summary tables of all results. 
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Figure S9a. Main effects plot for average outbreak size (all seedings) in the reactive policy; 
detection delay and severity are most influential, especially the highest terms; minor effects 
are due to restocking delay, national transport ban, and awareness campaign; changes in 
latency and culling delay have hardly any effect. 
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Figure S9b. Main effects plot for average outbreak size (all seedings) in the proactive policy; 
detection delay and severity are most influential, but especially the former parameter across a 
larger range; laboratory capacity also has a substantial effect, as does the national transport 
ban and the largest delay in latency and culling. 
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Figure S9c. Main effects plot for average outbreak size (all seedings) in the hybrid policy 
(fixed severity) is similar to the proactive case; the optimum rota ratio favours reactive 
detections. 
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Figure S9d. Main effects plot for average outbreak duration (excluding single-site and 
endemic outbreaks) in the reactive policy; the response variable is mostly sensitive to changes 
in detection and latency delay; none of the other factors has much effect. 
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Figure S9e. Main effects plot for average outbreak duration (excluding single-site and 
endemic outbreaks) in the proactive case. Detection delay and laboratory capacity are the two 
main factors. 
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In the following five tables (Table S6a-e) we list for the five main response measures 
and each of the three control policies (columns) lower c.q. upper bounds in factor 
levels for detection, culling, and restocking delays in days, and laboratory site-testing 
capacity per year. These bounds are derived from the main effects plots and represent 
parameter choices beyond which the response variable will on average exceed its 
overall mean. This criterion is itself arbitrary; perhaps even the average response is 
deemed unacceptably high, or practical considerations may make a suggested value 
unfeasible to achieve. Nevertheless, these bounds provide quantified suggestions of 
specific control policy aims for the studied English and Welsh fish farms and fisheries 
network. In addition, horizontal comparisons between columns and vertical 
comparisons of the same cell between tables both attest to the robustness of the 
results. Note that the proactive policy (silent spreading) often requires more 
conservative bounds than the other policies which assume that clinical expression of 
the hunted pathogen will drive (at least part of) the response. These tables form the 
basis for the general advice given in the main text’s Discussion section. 
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Table S6a. Average outbreak size (all seedings) 
 Reactive Proactive Hybrid 
Detection <= 200 <= 100 <= 200 
Culling <= 20 <= 20 <= 20 
Restocking >100 >= 50 > 200 
Lab Capacity n/a >= 100 >= 50 
n/a = not applicable 
 
Table S6b. Average outbreak size (excluding outbreaks of one single site) 
 Reactive Proactive Hybrid 
Detection <= 200 <= 100 <= 200 
Culling <= 20 < 20 < 10 
Restocking >= 200 >= 50 >= 500 
Lab Capacity n/a >= 100 >=50 
 
Table S6c. Maximum outbreak size 
 Reactive Proactive Hybrid 
Detection <= 200 <= 50 <= 50 
Culling <= 20 <= 20 <= 10 
Restocking >= 100 >= 50 >= 500 
Lab Capacity n/a >= 100 >= 100 
 
Table S6d. Number of endemic outbreaks 
 Reactive Proactive Hybrid 
Detection <= 200 < 200 < 200 
Culling Flat <= 20 <= 10 
Restocking >= 200 > 100 >= 200 
Lab Capacity n/a >= 100 >= 50 
 
Table S6e. Average outbreak duration (excluding outbreaks of one single site and 
endemic outbreaks) 
 Reactive Proactive Hybrid 
Detection <= 200 < 200 <= 200 
Culling <= 10 <= 10 <= 10 
Restocking Flat Flat Flat* 
Lab Capacity n/a >= 50 >= 50 
* = not significant in balanced ANOVA 
 
 
